Galveston Tow Swept Onto Power Lines – Tensaw and Albert Midstream NTSB MIR

Briefing on the NTSB report MIR-26-34 into the Tensaw and Albert contact at Galveston, Texas. A loaded tank barge tow was swept onto power transmission poles and a terminal breakwater while two towboats tried to change the tow around in a strong tidal current.

What Happened:

On 16 January 2025, the towing vessels Tensaw (65 ft, 19.8 m) and Albert (79 ft, 24 m) were taking two loaded tank barges out of Texas International Terminals (TXIT) in Galveston. The barges were lashed side by side and carried about 2.2 million gallons (about 8,300 m³) of diesel oil. The plan was for the Tensaw to back the tow out past the breakwater into the Galveston Channel. The Albert would then push on the starboard side to hold the tow against the current. Once in the channel, the two boats would swap the tow around so the Albert could push it east. Both captains knew the area had strong currents (~0.9 to 1.6 knots). They also knew the nearby power poles had been hit before. The Albert‘s port captain approved the plan by phone.

At about 1830 LT, the Tensaw began backing the tow out at about 1 kt. By 1843 LT the tow was in the channel, lying across a flood current that set it west toward the Pelican Island Bridge. The Tensaw captain radioed that he could not hold position. The Albert captain then left the starboard side and faced up on the box end of the barges. He did not tell the Tensaw first. The Tensaw asked him to go back to the starboard side and push the tow off the bridge. He declined because one face wire was already made fast. He told the tankerman, a crew member, to connect the port wire as well.

The two boats then tried to pivot the tow in line with the current. The Albert‘s port face wire parted and fouled its centreline propeller, which stopped that engine.

The captain shut down the port engine to protect it, leaving one engine working. At about 1848 LT the Tensaw struck a power transmission pole east of the bridge, then a second pole. At about 1850 LT the Tensaw hit the bridge fendering and the Albert hit the terminal breakwater.

Three power lines fell into the water and Pelican Island lost power for a time. Nobody was hurt and no oil was spilled. Damage was estimated at $1.1 million. The current measured near the terminal rose from 0.89 kts at 1803 LT to 1.53 kts at 1845 LT. The NTSB found the probable cause was the captains’ attempt to reconfigure the tow in the middle of a channel known for strong tidal currents.

Immediate Operational Checks:

Officers taking the watch today should check the following:

• Live current data: Check the real-time current meter, not just the tidal prediction, before you let go. Here the current rose by more than half a knot in 40 minutes. Rainfall upstream can add to the total flow caused by normal tidal streams. Positive and negative surges may also be caused by prolonged winds.
• Where you change the tow: Make tow configuration changes in sheltered water, inside the breakwater or alongside the berth. If the space is too tight, wait for slack water rather than moving the job into the stream. Low water slack always has less flow than high water slack. Consider putting the tow alongside before changing the towing arrangement.
• Brief the plan and stick to it: Agree each step with every boat, including what each boat does if the tow starts to set. Never change your role without telling the other wheelhouse first.
• Assist power: Match the assist vessel’s power to the tow and the current. Have extra assist power ready whenever a loaded tow will lie across the current.
• Local directives: Read the VTS directives on your electronic chart system before departure. VTS now bars TXIT departures when the flood is over 0.5 kts and bans midstream tow changes in that area.

Lessons Learned:

• Broadside to the current: As the tow left the breakwater, it lay at right angles to the flood. This put the full length of two loaded barges against the current, so one boat could not hold it. Plan the departure so the tow meets the stream lined up with the current, or time it for slack water.
• Midstream reconfiguration: The plan moved the hardest step, swapping the tow, out of shelter and into the strongest current, close to the bridge and power poles. That left no sea room if anything went wrong. Do the swap where the current cannot reach you, even if the berth is tight. Consider mooring or anchoring before changing the towing gear configuration.
• Unannounced change of plan: The Albert left its agreed position on the starboard side without telling the Tensaw. The one boat placed to push the tow clear was no longer there. The NTSB said that if the plan had been followed, the boats may have been able to turn the tow parallel to the current. Hold to the briefed roles, and if you must change, say so on the radio first. Have a contingency plan to abort the manoeuvre if something goes wrong. A plan without a contingency is very thin. Back up is the basis of seamanship.
• Face wire failure: The port face wire parted when the boats tried to pivot the tow, then fouled the centreline propeller. One failed line cost the Albert two of its three engines just when power was needed most. Check face wires before use, keep crew clear of the bight, and expect a parted line to end up in the propellers.
• Repeat locations: This was the third NTSB case in 18 months of a tow leaving TXIT being set toward the bridge and poles. A history of casualties at a berth calls for more safety margin, not confidence in local knowledge. A plan approved ashore still needs checking against the current on the day. Safety margin means increasing the horizontal distance between the vessels and navigational hazards. It also means timing operations for reduced exposure to risk factors like broadside exposure to tidal stream. See also our briefing on the bridge strike by the Mackenzie Rose.

Tags: Towing Operation, Allision, Tidal Current, Communication Failure, Risk Assessment

Official Report

Read the full safety report here: Contact of Towing Vessel Tensaw with Power Transmission Poles and Subsequent Contact of Towing Vessel Albert with Terminal Breakwater