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Fatal Elevator Shaft Accident on Arvia: A Door Interlock Is Not an Isolation – 1 Fatality

The cruise ship Arvia at sea
The passenger vessel Arvia. Image: Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Accident Investigation Report 20/2026. Contains public sector information licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Briefing on MAIB report 20/2026. The MAIB carried out this investigation on behalf of the Bermuda Ship Registry. It covers the Arvia elevator shaft fatality. A crew member, an electrical technician, was crushed in a passenger elevator shaft on board the passenger vessel Arvia.

What Happened:

On 26 October 2025, the passenger vessel Arvia was on passage from Southampton to Tenerife. There were 6,980 people on board. Passenger elevator 14 had been found stuck at deck 11 when the ship reached Southampton two days earlier. The night-shift electro-technical team spent two nights repairing it. The release on the deck 12 landing doors did not work. So, the team reached the elevator-car top from deck 14 several times, using the ladder in the shaft.

At about 0544 LT, the electrical technician switched the elevator back to normal mode for a running test. At deck 11, the staff electro-technical officer decided to look at a repaired cable bracket. The officer held the elevator-car doors open while the technician went up to the decks above. He could not open the deck 12 doors. So, he opened the deck 14 doors with a release key and stepped into the shaft.

The weighted landing doors closed behind him. The officer then moved away from the deck 11 doors. Now, every door was shut.

This completed the safety circuit, so the elevator could move again. It answered a call for deck 17 that was still stored in its controls. The car moved up and crushed the technician against the side of the shaft.

The electrical technician was pronounced dead at 0607 LT.

Immediate Operational Checks:

Electro-technical officers and anyone who supervises elevator work should check the following today:

  • Positive control first: Before anyone enters a shaft or an elevator-car top, put the elevator in inspection mode and operate the emergency stop. Then prove that the car cannot move. Do not enter unless someone has shown you this.
  • Door interlocks are not isolation: Landing door interlocks reset by themselves when the doors close. An open door stops the elevator only while it stays open. Never use an open door as your control-measure. Use inspection mode, the emergency stop and lock-out instead.
  • Permit at the worksite: The authorising officer must check the precautions at the worksite when the work starts. Do not sign the permit hours ahead of work. Issue permits just before work starts. Check that the barriers and controls are fully in place.
  • Stop when the job changes: If a test turns into an inspection, or you need a new way in, stop the job. Carry out a new job safety review and raise a new permit.
  • Access route: Test every landing door release. If one fails, move the elevator car to a landing where the release works. Do not climb down the shaft ladder.

Lessons Learned:

  • No shared plan: The staff electro-technical officer planned to inspect from the landing. The technician seems to have believed he had to reach the elevator-car top. Neither of them checked, and nobody asked what “OK boss” meant. Agree the method out loud before any shaft work. Agree it again every time the plan changes.
  • Self-resetting barriers: The team relied on people holding doors open, not on a lock-out. Once the doors closed, the elevator could move with a man in the shaft. Use barriers that stay in place until you remove them yourself. MAIB has recommended (2026/159) that the operator review its use of self-resetting door interlocks as a barrier during maintenance.
  • Scope drift: Over two nights, the work grew beyond what the permit allowed. The team added shaft access and work at height, but nobody stopped to reassess the risks. Treat every change of method as a new job, with its own risk assessment and permit.
  • Uneven training: The third electro-technical officer supervised the work and raised the permits. This officer had no formal lift / elevator safety training. Without it, a supervisor may not spot the hazards. Make sure everyone who plans or supervises elevator work has completed elevator safety training.
  • Known hazard: Similar lift / elevator fatalities have happened before. An electrical technician died on British Mallard and an electrical cadet died on MSC Colombia in 2007. A chief electrician died on Carnival Ecstasy in 2015. Brief these cases to your team before elevator work. See also our briefing on the cadet fatality aboard Grandeur of the Seas, another maintenance task on a passenger vessel that ended in tragedy.

Tags: Fatal Accident, Permit to Work, Isolation Failure, Passenger Vessel, Crush Injury

Official Report

Read the full safety report here: Fatal accident to a crew member on board the Bermuda registered passenger vessel Arvia (MAIB report 20/2026)

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